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Abstract
We present a chosen plaintext attack on the NTRU encryption system. We assume that the attacker can detect wrap errors, that
the blinding polynomial is generated from three parts (as speciﬁed in the standards) and that the attacker has a large database of
carefully selected plaintexts. The attack is based on the fact that wrap errors occur more frequently if blinding polynomials with
larger coefﬁcients are used.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The NTRU cryptosystem was ﬁrst presented in 1998 [4]. Since then, several minor modiﬁcations have been intro-
duced, but the main ideas have remained the same. For different versions of NTRU see [9]. At the moment NTRU is
also being standardized, see [2,6]. We follow the system and notations as given in [2].
The peculiar property of NTRU is that decryption does not always succeed. There is a possibility that to decrypt
one ciphertext several decryption attempts have to be made. It might even happen that decryption fails completely.
Fortunately the probabilities of these events are so small that normally it is not signiﬁcant. However, the security of an
earlier version of NTRU was susceptible of this property. In [7] Jaulmes and Joux presented a chosen-ciphertext attack,
where the attacker changed a legal cryptotext slightly to observe if the decryption would still succeed. Based on which
decryptions failed, the attacker then could quite easily ﬁnd out information about the private key.
After attacks like this NTRU was changed. It now includes what they call the Fujisaki–Okamoto Self-Referential
Technique to block cryptotexts that are not rightfully generated.
Our attack is somewhat similar to that of [7], as also we try to ﬁnd the private key by observing whether the decryptor
faces problems during decryption. However, we use only legally produced ciphertexts.
Our attack works as long as the blinding polynomial has large enough coefﬁcients. There are several other attacks
based on different aspects of NTRUEncrypt, see [3,5,8,10].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the NTRU encryption system. Special emphasis is put
on features relevant from the point of view of our attack. Section 3 then describes the attack. An example of realistic
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size is given in Section 4. In Section 5 we mention one way to improve the attack and in Section 6 we list some ﬁnal
remarks.
2. The NTRUEncrypt system
The basic objects of NTRU are polynomials in the ringR=Z[x]/(xN −1). These polynomials are frequently reduced
modulo p and q, the small and large modulus. The large modulus q is an integer, so reduction modulo q is performed
by reducing the coefﬁcients of the polynomial modulo q. The small modulus p is a polynomial p= 2+ x, and it is easy
to see that representatives modulo p are (almost) exactly the binary polynomials in R.
Polynomials with “small” non-negative coefﬁcients play an important role in NTRU. Let a(x)=∑ aixi and denote
T (d) =
{












Below we outline the NTRUEncrypt procedures.
2.1. Key generation
In NTRU N, p and q are system wide parameters, and thus public information.
The private key f ∈ R is of the form f = 1 + p ∗ F , where the standard gives two options for F. Either F is a
randomly selected binary polynomial from TB(df ), or F = f1 ∗ f2 + f3 with each fi ∈ T (df i). From the point of
view of our attack it does not matter which option is selected.
The public key h is obtained by selecting a polynomial g from TB(dg) and then computing h = f −1 ∗ g (mod q).
The polynomial g is not needed after the key generation, and thus need not be remembered. Our attack aims to reveal
g, after which the private key f can be computed from g and h.
The generation methods of f and g as well as the values of df (or df i) and dg are public information.
2.2. Encryption
NTRU is a probabilistic public key cryptosystem, hence one plaintext message has several possible encryptions.
Encryption of message m is performed by ﬁrst generating a message representative i and a blinding polynomial r,
and then computing the ciphertext
e = i + r ∗ p ∗ h (mod q).
The calculation of i and r is performed by ﬁrst generating some random data b and then computing i = (m, b) and
r = (m, b). Without going into details, i will be a random looking binary polynomial. The mapping  is efﬁciently
invertible: given i it is possible to compute m and b. There are two options for the generation of r. Either it will be a
binary polynomial from TB(dr), or it will be computed as r = r1 ∗ r2 + r3, where each ri ∈ T (dri). In both cases r will
be a polynomial from T (dr). Our attack will assume the latter option.
2.3. Decryption
Decryption starts by computing
a = f ∗ e (mod q).
It can be easily veriﬁed that a =  (mod q), where
= f ∗ i + p ∗ r ∗ g.
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Moreover, since all the coefﬁcients of the polynomials involved are small, it is very likely that all coefﬁcients of  lie
within a certain interval of length q. If this is the case, the decryptor can reduce the coefﬁcients of a to this interval and
obtain . As f = 1 (modp), reduction modulo p then gives i.
However, it is possible that the decryptor will not get the correct . Then there are two alternatives.
• The coefﬁcients of a were reduced to a wrong interval of length q (wrap failure).
• The difference between the smallest and largest coefﬁcients of  is larger than q (gap failure).
To check whether one of these cases occurred we use re-encryption: from the obtained message representative i′ one
computes m′ and b′, and further r ′ = (m′, b′). Then from i′ and r ′ one gets the encryption e′. If e = e′, then also
i = i′ and the decryption has succeeded. If e = e′, then either a wrap or a gap failure has occurred, or e was not a
valid encryption at all. The decryptor must assume that the reason was a wrap failure. To recover (s)he reduces the
coefﬁcients of a to a different interval, until decryption succeeds (or (s)he decides that it was not a wrap failure and
quits).
The candidate for the proper interval is ﬁrst selected as [A,A + q), where A (or actually A + q/2) is the (expected)
average coefﬁcient of . This is easily obtained if (1) is known. Clearly (1)= f (1)i(1)+p(1)r(1)g(1), where only
i(1) is unknown. But (1) = a(1) (mod q), so i(1) (mod q) can be computed. As i is a random binary polynomial, it is
very probable that N/2−q/2 i(1)<N/2+q/2. Making this assumption one gets the average decryption coefﬁcient
A and the ﬁrst guess on the proper interval. A wrap (or gap) error occurs only if at least one coefﬁcient differs by q/2
from the average.
There are at least two reasons to adopt the “check back” decryption algorithm. Decryption always produces some
candidate message representative i′. If a wrap or gap failure has occurred, then i′ is incorrect. Using the method above
one can check whether this is the case. Secondly, this method guarantees that the encryptor can create a valid cryptotext
e only if (s)he knows the corresponding plaintext m. This plaintext awareness property is advantageous from the point
of view of hindering some of the most powerful cryptographic attacks, such as adaptive chosen cryptotext attacks [1].
Speciﬁcally, it is a valid counter-measure against the reaction attack presented in [7].
3. The attack
Our attack is based on the observation that blinding polynomials r with large coefﬁcients generate wrap errors more
frequently than polynomials with small coefﬁcients. Therefore, by a careful selection of pairs (m, b) (which determine
r), one can make the wrap error probability rather large. This probability gives us useful information on the private key.
Throughout this chapter we assume that the parameter set ees251ep1 of [2] is used. Thus, N = 251, p = 2 + x and
q = 128. The private key f is of the form f = 1 + p ∗ F , where F ∈ T (72) (and thus f ∈ T (217)). The polynomial g
is binary with 72 1’s: g ∈ TB(72).
We assume that the blinding polynomial is generated from three components: r = r1 ∗ r2 + r3, where each ri ∈ T (8)
[2, algorithm 3.3.3.2]. Most coefﬁcients of ri’s are therefore 0, only few equal 1. Also a 2 (or bigger) is possible, but
they are few and far between. It follows that also the coefﬁcients of r are very small: r ∈ T (72). Most coefﬁcients are
0’s and 1’s (as the average is 72251 ). However, also larger values appear; this time more frequently than in ri’s. The main
tools in our attack are polynomials which have a suitably large number of “large” coefﬁcients (4 or 5, for instance).
As noted earlier, the wrap failure occurs if at least one coefﬁcient of  = f ∗ i + p ∗ r ∗ g differs by q/2 from the
average. Our goal is to
• generate such pairs (m, b) that the wrap error probability correlates with the coefﬁcients of p ∗ g;
• increase the wrap error probability to such a level that the differences between distinct types of polynomials p ∗ g
are efﬁciently detectable.
Our goals are achieved by generating pairs (m, b) such that the resulting blinding polynomial r has some large coefﬁ-
cients. In the following we denote r =∑ rixi , g =∑ gixi and = p ∗ g =∑ ixi . Clearly, i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and if
we learn i then both gi and gi−1 are revealed. For example, if i = 3 then gi = gi−1 = 1. Also, the 72 indices i for
which i2 are exactly those for which gi = 1.
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We increase the wrap probability by trying to make some coefﬁcient of  ∗ r (and hence also ) exceptionally large.
Suppose that u+ij =3 and that rv−ij are large for some indices u, v and i1, . . . , is (additions in subindices are reduced
modulo N). Then all of the large coefﬁcients rv−ij contribute partly to the same coefﬁcient of  ∗ r . More speciﬁcally,
the coefﬁcient of xu+v in  ∗ r is at least 3 ×∑sj=1 rv−ij . As the rest of the non-zero coefﬁcients of r contribute to
random terms in  ∗ r , it is obvious that wrap failures become more frequent than normally.
The attack consists of four steps. In the ﬁrst step we attempt to locate four 3’s of . After the second step we should
have learned 15 3’s of . In the third step we spot the rest of ’s coefﬁcients that are at least 2, thus revealing g. The
ﬁnal step consists of computing the private key f from g and the public key h.
In steps 1 and2weuseblindingpolynomialswith four coefﬁcients ri4. For this purpose, denote byMk4×4(i0, . . . , i3)
a set of k pairs (m, b) such that for some u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 250} the coefﬁcients ru+ij 4 (j=0, 1, 2, 3), where r=(m, b).
In step 3 we use blinding polynomials with one coefﬁcient at least 5. A set of pairs (m, b) resulting in this kind of
blinding polynomial is denoted byM1×5.
All probabilities given below are estimates based on our implementations.
3.1. First step
Our ﬁrst goal is to locate four large coefﬁcients of  = p ∗ g in one of its cyclic shifts xu ∗ . For this purpose we
encrypt messages in the setsM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, i3). Clearly, the quadruples (i0, i1, i2, i3) corresponding to four 3’s of 
induce high wrap probability. In this case the large coefﬁcients of r contribute to some term of ∗r by 4×4×3=48, and
therefore this term of  has a fair chance of exceeding the average by q/2=64, thus causing a wrap failure. Therefore the
setM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, i3) that most frequently induceswrap failuresmost probably gives u−i0 =u−i1 =u−i2 =u−i3 =3(for some index u). The setup is depicted in Fig. 1.
Fortunately it is not necessary to go through all setsM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, i3). The average number of 3’s in  is 72 · 71251 ≈
20, and therefore a random guess of four indices has a reasonable chance (roughly 1%) of hitting four 3’s in one of ’s
rotations. Therefore, if we randomly select, say, 1000 quadruples and select the one that causes the most wrap failures,
most probably we have found four 3’s.
In our tests we made 1000 guesses for (i0, i1, i2, i3), generated 1000 encryptions for each such quadruple, and
counted the number of wrap failures. The probability that this process found four 3’s in  turned out to be 90%. In most
of the erroneous cases we found three 3’s and a 2. With 200 sets of 200 messages the probability of success was 16 and
with a probability of 40% we found three 3’s and a 2.
3.2. Second step
In the ﬁrst step we learned i0, i1, i2 and i3 such that u−i0 = u−i1 = u−i2 = u−i3 = 3 for some u. Next we exploit
these to ﬁnd more large coefﬁcients of . More speciﬁcally, the goal is that after this step we have found 15 3’s (or
possibly some 2’s among them) in . Note that the probability that  has at least 15 3’s is roughly 97%.
We encrypt the messages in the setsM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, k),M10004×4 (i0, i1, i3, k),M10004×4 (i0, i2, i3, k) andM10004×4 (i1, i2,
i3, k) for all 0k250, k = ij . The wrap probability depends in this case on the coefﬁcient u−k: the higher the wrap
probability, the larger u−k (see Fig. 2). We make the assumption that the 11 k’s with the highest wrap probabilities
give 11 large coefﬁcients u−k (3’s and possibly a few 2’s among them).
This approach has one problem. It is possible that, for example, for some v = u the coefﬁcients of xv−i0 , xv−i1 , xv−i2
in  are also 3’s. In this case there is a good chance that u−k is selected to be large, although it is not. Fortunately we
Fig. 1. The four large coefﬁcients of r match the large coefﬁcients of  resulting in a higher wrap error frequency.
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Fig. 2. The four large coefﬁcients of r match three known large coefﬁcients of  and the position corresponding to k. The number of wrap errors at
step 2 gives us information about that coefﬁcient.
have a good chance of detecting such situations, as then the number of wrap errors generated byM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, k)’s
differs from other three cases and are more frequent. If this is the case, we can replaceM10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, k) by some
M10004×4 (i0, i1, i4, k), where most probably u−i4 = 3 based on the other three cases.
Using the sets of 1000 messages, when we had found four 3’s in step 1, the sum of 15 indices found in step 2 was
in our tests always at least 41. On the other hand, if we found three 3’s and a 2, the sum of 15 indices was at least 41
in half of our tests and at least 37 with a probability of 90%.
Using the sets of 200 messages and having found four 3’s in step 1, the sum of the 15 indices was at least 41 with a
probability of 70% and always at least 37. With three 3’s and one 2 the sum was at least 37 with a probability of 13 .
3.3. Third step
To start with, we have spotted 15 3’s (or 2’s) in ∗xu for some u. Our strategy is to test the largeness of the remaining
terms one at a time. We also test whether the earlier spotted 15 coefﬁcients really are large.
Let u−j be the coefﬁcient to be examined, and assume that u−i0 , . . . , u−i14 are known to be large.We use blinding
polynomials r with one peak: rv5 for some v. Moreover, we assume that
∑14
=0 rv−j+i25. (If j = i then the term
rv is excluded from the sum.)Assuming that the average of known large coefﬁcients u−i is at least 2.5, the coefﬁcient
of xu+v−j in r ∗  is at least 2.5 · 25 + 5 · u−j . The consequence is that wrap failures are quite probable, and the
probability is strongly inﬂuenced by u−j .
We test each index u−j by selecting and encrypting (say) 1000 pairs (m, b) such that the resulting blinding poly-
nomial satisﬁes the conditions above. Then we sort the indices u− j according to the number of wrap failures. The 72
highest wrap failure rates give us the 72 large u−j ’s (those that equal 2 or 3). And, as already observed, these values
reveal the polynomial g ∗ xu.
Our tests have shown that this step is the most accurate and can correct the possible errors we have made in the
previous steps.
When the sum of the 15 indices of step 2 was 41 and we used sets of 1000 messages this step almost always revealed
. With sets of 200 messages we failed to spot in average four 1’s in g. In the case where the sum of the 15 indices was
37 and we used sets of 1000 messages, we failed to spot in average one 1 in g.
It seems impractical to construct a sufﬁciently large database of pairs (m, b) for every 16-tuple of indicesu, i0, . . . , i14.
Fortunately this is not necessary. It is sufﬁcient to have a database of pairs (m, b) such that the resulting blinding
polynomial has the required peak. If the peak value is 5, then roughly 1 out of 30 peak polynomials can be used
to test u w.r.t. indices i0, . . . , i14. Hence, a database of 30 000 pairs (m, b) that result in a peak polynomial is large
enough. For each index to be tested there are roughly 1000 suitable pairs in the database.
3.4. Computing the private key f
Let us ﬁnally show how to compute the private key f from the polynomial g we already learned. Denote (x) =
(xN − 1)/(x − 1) = x250 + x249 + x248 + · · · + 1. As  decomposes into ﬁve prime factors of degree 50, with a very
high probability gcd(h,) = 1 in Z2[x], where h = f −1 ∗ g (mod 128) is the public key. Thus, we can ﬁnd out the
polynomials H0, a and b such that
h ∗ H0 − a ∗ = 1 − 2b
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using the Extended Euclidean algorithm. We also have
h ∗ H0 = 1 − 2b (mod),
h ∗ H0 ∗ (1 + 2b) = 1 − 4b2 (mod),
h ∗ H0 ∗ (1 + 2b)(1 + 4b2) = 1 − 16b4 (mod),
h ∗ H0 ∗ (1 + 2b)(1 + 4b2)(1 + 16b4) = 1 − 256b8 (mod).
The polynomial H =H0 ∗ (1+2b)(1+4b2)(1+16b4) is called the pseudo-inverse of h in the ring Z128[x]/(x251 −1).
We have
g ∗ H = f ∗ f −1 ∗ g ∗ H = f ∗ h ∗ H = f (mod, 128),
where f −1 is the inverse of f modulo x251 − 1 in Z128[x]. Therefore
f = g ∗ H + c ∗  (mod x251 − 1, 128)
for some c ∈ Z128. From the condition
f (1) = g(1) · H(1) + c · (1),
we obtain c = (217 − 72 · H(1)) · 251−1 (mod 128).
3.5. Generating suitable blinding polynomials
As mentioned above, we assume that the blinding polynomial r is constructed from three parts: r = r1 ∗ r2 + r3,
where each ri ∈ T (8). The parts ri are generated [2, algorithm 3.3.3.2] by selecting eight random indices j0, . . . , j7
(repetitions allowed) and setting ri=xj0 +· · ·+xj7 . In theory, the “random” indices are not random, they are determined
by the message m, random data b and some speciﬁed pseudo-random number generator. However, we obtain a similar
distribution of r’s via random selection (assuming the security of the used PRNG).
We note that there are about 6.5 × 105 different quadruple modulo rotations when N = 251.
In the attack we needed two types of blinding polynomials. The following probabilities are obtained by generating
blinding polynomials randomly.
• About one pair (m, b) out of 10 000 pairs produces a blinding polynomial r = (m, b) with four coefﬁcients of
values at least four. Such polynomials are needed for about 6.5 × 105 quadruples (i0, i1, i2, i3). The construction
of the database requires about 6.5 × 1012 message representative generations. Computing these seems to be the
most demanding task of the attack. In fact, the whole database requires approximately 20 gigabytes of memory.
• Roughly one pair (m, b) out of 250 pairs produces a blinding polynomial r = (m, b) with one coefﬁcient of
value at least 5.
It should be noted that if the parts ri are required to be binary polynomials, it is much harder to generate r’s with large
enough coefﬁcients and the construction of the databases will take a longer time. Alternatively, one could modify the
attack to use somewhat smaller blinding polynomials, which again would result in a lower success probability. It would
still be possible to apply a similar attack.
4. An example
Next we show an example of the attack:
We attack a systemwith a private key f and a public key h=f −1∗g (mod q). Just for reference, we list the coefﬁcients
of the polynomials f and = (2 + x) ∗ g from the smallest to the largest exponent:
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Table 1
Step 1. List of best choices for the quadruple corresponding to four 3’s
Quadruples marked with a star do not correspond to four 3’s in  and choosing one
of them would cause some problems for the attack.
f

:1 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 3,
5, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 2, 5, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3,
1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2,
1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 4, 2, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0, 4, 4, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 3, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3,
3, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0
:0 , 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0,
0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1,
2, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0,
0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0, 2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2,
1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1
Step 1: We randomly select 1000 quadruples and sets M10004×4 (i0, i1, i2, i3). After we have encrypted and decrypted
all one million messages the quadruples that generated the most wrap errors are listed in Table 1 . We select the
best quadruple (21, 159, 204, 205) that induced 11 wrap errors. We make a guess that for some index u we have
u−21 = u−159 = u−204 = u−205 = 3. The real attacker would not know for sure if this is true, but we see that it is
for u = 217.
Step 2: Next, for indices k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 80}, we encrypt messages in the sets M10004×4 (21, 159, 204, k),
M10004×4 (21, 159, 205, k), M10004×4 (21, 204, 205, k) and M10004×4 (159, 204, 205, k) and observe the number of wrap er-
rors. Results can be seen in Table 2.We have included the coefﬁcients 217−k in the last column. Of course, the attacker
does not know them (yet), but they clearly demonstrate the correlation between them and the number of wrap errors
induced. We add the 11 k’s with largest wrap error rates to the four indices picked in Step 1. The 15 indices are then
17, 18, 21, 22, 33, 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 71, 72, 159, 204, 205.
Note that we only examined about one-third of the indices, and therefore 217−k < 3 for some picked k’s. But this does
not matter, as all large coefﬁcients of  ∗ x217 will be found in Step 3. Naturally, more reliable results are obtained if
we go through all indices.
Step 3: The next task is to ﬁnd 1000 suitable pairs (m, b) ∈M1×5 for each index k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 250} (as described
earlier). Again, we observe the number of wrap errors encountered (Table 3). We assume that the 72 largest wrap
counts—anything over 80 here—correspond to 2’s and 3’s in some rotation of . If this is correct, we have discovered
a rotation of the polynomial g. In our case the guess is indeed true: we have discovered g ∗ x217. However, the attacker
must proceed to the next step to check the validity of the obtained g.
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Table 2
Step 2. Wrap error counts for the ﬁrst 81 k’s
In the last column there is the corresponding coefﬁcient of x217−k in .
Step 4: Let g′ be the polynomial found in Step 3. Our ﬁnal task is to compute f ′ such that f ′−1 ∗ g′ = h (mod q),
where h is the public key. Applying the method described earlier we obtain f ′ = f ∗ x217, and the key is broken.
In this example we did not use actual messages to generate useful blinding polynomials. Instead, for Steps 1 and 2
we selected random binary polynomials with weight 56 and added 4 to some four coefﬁcients. For Step 3 we selected
random binary polynomials with weight 45, added 5 to one coefﬁcient and distributed the rest of the weight, 22,
randomly between 15 coefﬁcients.
5. A method to create more wrap errors
The attack we have described would be more efﬁcient if wrap failures occurred more frequently. And, in fact, we
can make this happen. As noted before, the generation function of the message representative i from the message m
and randomness b is invertible. Therefore, we can select messages m such that, for example, i(1)>N/2 + q/2. Then
the average coefﬁcient of , i.e. A, is computed to be too small (by 110 if N = 251) and wrap errors are inevitable. The
decryptor is still able to correct the error if (s)he tries to correct A as stated in the standard. The number of corrections
needed depends on the largest coefﬁcient of .
Our attack exploited the connection between the largest coefﬁcient of  and a guess on the polynomial g. Then, a
large coefﬁcient was detected by wrap errors, which occurred quite rarely. Using this new approach we get information
on the largest coefﬁcient in every decryption process, provided that we can ﬁnd out how many changes were made to
A before success. This information can be obtained by measuring the time decrypting a message takes.
We expect the modiﬁcation sketched above to be signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient than the original one.
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Table 3
Step 3. Wrap error counts for all k’s
In the last column there is the corresponding coefﬁcient of x217−k in .
Although not speciﬁed in the standards, NTRU recommends that the polynomial g does not have any two consecutive
coefﬁcients equal to 1 [5]. Therefore the coefﬁcients of p ∗ g are all smaller than 3, which makes our basic attack less
effective. However, it seems that the modiﬁed approach would still work.
The starting point for this modiﬁcation of the attack was that it is easy to ﬁnd messages with representatives of
large weight. Several other attacks are based on the same property, see [8,3,10]. These attacks do not require blinding
polynomials with large coefﬁcients. Indeed, even in the binary case, there are serious security implications if wrap or
gap errors occur too frequently.
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6. Remarks and conclusion
We conclude this article by listing some remarks on the attack.
The starting assumption in our attack is that the attacker can detect wrap failures. An obvious method would be to
measure the time decryption takes. To make the attack impossible, one could make the decryption algorithm constant
time, as if wrap failures occurred every time. A more efﬁcient way would be to simulate wrap failures every now and
then. Also, the decryption machinery could count the number of wrap failures it faces. If they occur too frequently, the
key should be changed.
The counter-measure we would like to recommend is to always require that the blinding polynomial r is binary.
Speciﬁcally r should not be constructed from two or more smaller parts.
The generation of the required databases M4×4 and M1×5 can (and must) be done off-line. The workload of
generating these sets could be divided to the whole Internet, for example. The same library can be used to break any
NTRU key.
Our attack is by no means optimized; most probably similar ideas can be used to extract g more efﬁciently. For
example, one could use blinding polynomials with different patterns or even larger coefﬁcients. Also, we have ignored
that the coefﬁcients of  obey a certain pattern. For example, a 3 is always preceded by another 3 or a 2. Finally, it
is not necessary to discover g exactly. If we ﬁnd a close enough approximation, we can apply some lattice reduction
methods to extract f (and g).
It should also be mentioned that although the attack is designed against a particular set of parameters, it can be
modiﬁed to beat efﬁciently any parameter set, as long as one can generate blinding polynomials with large coefﬁcients.
The complexity seems to be linear with respect to N, the degree of polynomials. However, the number of quadruples
increases more rapidly, so construction of the databases becomes more troublesome.
References
[1] D. Bleichenbacher, Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS#1, Advances in
Cryptology—Crypto ’98, Springer, Berlin, 1992.
[2] Efﬁcient Embedded Security Standard (EESS) #1: Draft 4, Consortium for Efﬁcient Embedded Security, March, 2002.
[3] D. Han, J. Han, D. Kwon, J. Hong, A new chosen ciphertext attack against NTRU, unpublished manuscript.
[4] J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, J.H. Silverman, NTRU: a ring-based public key cryptosystem, in: J.P. Buhler (Ed.), Algorithmic Number Theory (ANTS
III), Portland, OR, June 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1423, Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 267–288.
[5] N. Howgrave-Graham, P.Q. Nguyen, D. Pointcheval, A. Singer, W. Whyte, Padding schemes and decryption failures in NTRUEncrypt,
unpublished manuscript.
[6] IEEE P1363.1, Standard Speciﬁcation for Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques Based on Hard Problems over Lattices.
[7] É. Jaulmes, A. Joux, A chosen-ciphertext attack against NTRU, Advances in Cryptology—Crypto 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 1880, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 20–35.
[8] P.Q. Nquyen, D. Pointcheval, Analysis and improvements of NTRU encryption paddings, Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2002, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2442, Springer, Berlin, 2002, pp. 210–225.
[9] <www.ntru.com>.
[10] J. Proos, Imperfect decryption and an attack on the NTRU encryption scheme, Technical Report, available at <http://www.cacr.
math.uwaterloo.ca/tech_reports.html>.
